Hasht-e-Subh Ahmad al-Sharaa has achieved a great deal for Syria in a short period by adopting a pragmatic strategy. Some of the opportunities that have emerged are the
direct result of his efforts; others are tied to Damascus’s regional position and the ongoing power struggles among major regional and global actors. Not only did al-Sharaa meet with Donald Trump, but he also succeeded in persuading him to ease the grip of economic sanctions. The European Union, too, agreed to a complete lifting of sanctions—a development that has served as a lifeline for al-Sharaa.
This, by all accounts, stemmed from his recent trip to France. In another key development, Tom Barrack, the U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, was recently appointed the White House’s Special Representative for Syrian Affairs. He promptly met with al-Sharaa and spoke of him in favorable terms. Even Israel’s tone toward Syria’s current ruler has recently softened—a shift that, according to some reports, is the result of a newly opened backchannel between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
Why Did the U.S. Pivot Toward Syria So Quickly?
1) A closer look reveals that with the start of Trump’s regional tour, Syria suddenly found itself at the center of his attention, even to the point where he disregarded Israeli objections on the matter. The roles of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye were key to this urgency, and Trump himself alluded to this influence.
Returning to the White House, as he put it, “with trillions of dollars,” Trump sought to please his hosts by agreeing to meet with al-Sharaa and ease sanctions—moves that in turn made Syria’s current leader indebted to those Arab states. If the question of Syria’s reconstruction is on the table, one thing is certain: Trump will not spend a single cent from America’s coffers. Instead, he intends to delegate that responsibility to Washington’s Arab allies. For the Arab world to take the lead in this arena, the U.S. needed to issue a sanctions waiver for Syria.
At this point, Trump has reaped a dual benefit: not only has he gained leverage over al-Sharaa and his Arab backers, but he has also shifted Syrian public opinion in his favor. The scenes of Syrians taking to the streets in celebration, dancing and rejoicing, are one example of this shift.
In all of this, al-Sharaa’s eagerness to restore ties with the United States stands out as particularly significant. He has come to realize that Syria can only hope to experience a better future if it remains on friendly terms with the West, especially the U.S., and its regional allies.
Indeed, no country in the world has achieved development by antagonizing the Western powers, particularly America. This realization reflects al-Sharaa’s grounded understanding of the current global order and the extent to which great powers shape the fate of medium and small powers.
2) If the U.S. intended to remain in the Middle East over the long haul, it would be constantly flexing its military muscles against certain countries to justify a continued military buildup and expansion of bases. But Washington’s pursuit of a nuclear agreement with Iran and its push to expand the Abraham Accords indicate a waning appetite for entrenchment in the region.
As the U.S. prepares to pull back, it must accomplish two critical objectives. First, it needs to ensure its regional allies are sufficiently empowered so that, in its absence, the strategic vacuum doesn’t tilt in favor of its adversaries.
Increasing the number of friendly states is one way to address this concern. Second, it wants to leave behind a positive legacy, lest the debacle of Afghanistan resurface as a cautionary tale. In a post-American Middle East, Washington’s regional partners can only operate effectively if the region enjoys a measure of security.
That stability, in turn, depends on managing crises in countries like Syria. America’s allies would prefer it not to withdraw, but if that’s inevitable, they want “security guarantees” that would enable them to defend themselves against potential threats. American interests, too, are served by regional stability—not to mention the sensitive issue of oil prices, which often acts as a powerful driver of U.S. policy.
3) Russia and Iran were the key allies of Syria’s former regime under Bashar al-Assad. Despite their deep involvement, neither Tehran nor Moscow was able to resolve Syria’s crisis. Assad had also shown a tilt toward China, seeking Beijing’s help in Syria’s reconstruction. He visited China a year before his ouster. Given this history, Washington is now eager to present itself as a more effective alternative, hoping to steer the current Syrian leadership toward stability and economic growth. In doing so, it aims to offer a stark contrast between the results of American influence and those of its rivals. Trump, in particular, seems to be awaiting the day he can claim that he helped rebuild a Syria that, in his telling, was devastated by Iranian and Russian intervention, with the help of America’s Arab allies.
Syria and the Abraham Accords: Al-Sharaa Faces a Tough Choice. The expansion of the Abraham Accords is of paramount importance to Trump, and Syria is seen as a country that could potentially join soon. The recent easing of sanctions appears closely tied to this objective. If Damascus signs onto the Accords, it would mark a major diplomatic victory for Trump: transforming a nation that, until recently, hosted Iran and Hezbollah and posed what Israel considered an “existential threat,” into a partner of Tel Aviv.
Al-Sharaa, it appears, is not encumbered by rigid preconditions and is willing to accept modest gains—a fact well understood by American and Israeli officials. Since assuming power, he has avoided making any bold statements in support of the Palestinians. This restraint stems from an awareness of his political limits.
He knows that taking such a stance would not only fail to alter the regional calculus but could also put his own life at risk. Equally important is the perspective of key Arab states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Türkiye, and others. Al-Sharaa seeks to align Syria’s approach to Israel with the calibrated stances of these nations. Moreover, without taking their positions into account, it would be difficult for him to formally join the Abraham Accords, particularly if such a move were made contingent upon improvements in Gaza or minimum steps toward recognizing Palestinian rights.
Most notably, al-Sharaa has reportedly opened a secret communication channel with Israel. His goal is to temper Israel’s behavior—especially its military strikes on Syrian territory—while ensuring Trump’s diplomatic engagement with Damascus continues uninterrupted. In a significant gesture, he even expelled certain Palestinian militant leaders from Syria, hoping to reassure Israeli leadership and to rebrand Damascus as a non-threat. Al-Sharaa understands that confronting Israel with limited resources is futile. Should he adopt an antagonistic posture, it would not be surprising if he were assassinated in his palace. Israel, often seen as “an exception to the rule,” rarely feels compelled to justify its actions to international bodies. Faced with this reality, al-Sharaa has chosen silence—even if that silence is interpreted as submission.
A Turn Toward the West, A Neglect of the East—Can Syria Find Stability? In this context, “the East” refers to nations opposed to, or in strategic competition with, the West—namely Iran, Russia, and China. So far, al-Sharaa has placed little emphasis on fostering ties with these powers. His longstanding animosity toward Iran makes reconciliation unlikely in the near term.
His memories of Russia’s past behavior are also far from positive, though he voices his displeasure less openly. That said, one must not forget that both Moscow and Tehran, given their long-standing presence and intimate knowledge of Syria’s internal landscape, retain the capacity to create serious complications for al-Sharaa. Just recently, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that Syria was on the verge of “full-scale civil war”—a veiled reference to the potential for foreign interference.
Just as Syria in the past failed to achieve stability by cutting off the West and leaning exclusively on Russia and Iran, it now risks facing new challenges if it entirely sidelines Moscow and Tehran in favor of their rivals. Thus, even under al-Sharaa’s pragmatic leadership, Syria’s long-term stability will require a careful balancing act between East and West—one that makes optimal use of all available partnerships and avoids a return to geopolitical isolation.