Hasht -e- subh Syria has become one of the main centers for the gathering of individuals and extremist jihadist groups, which, for at least the past decade, have fought either in support of or in opposition to the government led by Bashar al-Assad. These groups have played a significant role in the rise and suppression of ISIS, as well as in Syria’s internal conflicts and all of their consequences.
The fall of the Assad family regime, which had turned into a full-fledged dictatorship, and its treatment of certain opponents in a manner utterly disheartening and far from human values, has brought smiles to the faces of many Syrian citizens and created hope for change in some political circles around the world. However, can Assad’s opponents, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, guide this broken country to a safe shore where peace can prevail under democratic values? This is a question that only time will answer.
According to independent assessments and the views of some security experts, proxy groups and foreign mercenaries have played a role on par with the Syrian army and internal opposition forces in supporting or opposing the Assad regime. This article will briefly explore the future of jihadist proxy and mercenary groups on both sides of the conflict and examine what role these groups will play in the future of Syria and the extent to which they will impact the security of the Middle East and the international community.
Who are the Foreign Jihadist Forces?
- A) Supporters of Assad
The government led by Bashar al-Assad, which effectively collapsed on December 8, 2024, had various supporters, including states (Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran) and proxy mercenary groups. This article will not delve into how states supported Assad through official channels but will focus on the role of proxy groups.
These foreign jihadist forces were primarily organized, equipped, and supported under the leadership of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Four key groups that seriously supported Assad in the internal conflict and in fighting against ISIS include the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainabiyoun Brigade, Hussayniyun Brigade, and Hezbollah.
1) Fatemiyoun Brigade
The Fatemiyoun Brigade, according to reports from commanders and the group itself, is composed of Afghan migrants living in Iran seeking employment in various sectors such as construction, stone cutting, and others. Life for Afghan migrants in Iran worsened over time due to factors like economic pressures on the Iranian government, informal anti-immigrant policies, and the broader societal context. While some Iranian media close to the government have described the formation of this group as a spontaneous act by members of the “Mohammad Brigade” (established to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan), other reports suggest that, due to the worsening situation in the Middle East, especially with the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iran, leveraging economic pressures and sometimes religious motivations, recruited Afghans to form the Fatemiyoun Brigade for fighting ISIS and supporting Assad’s government in Syria. The brigade played a decisive role in the battle against ISIS, although there are reports of its use by Assad’s government against Syrian civilians.
The exact number of Fatemiyoun members remains unclear, but the group continues to operate in the Middle East and is considered an important military asset for Iran. However, as seen in recent battles and attacks by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, no active military engagements or support for Assad’s government by the Fatemiyoun have been reported. Some videos of the group’s members in Syria were circulated on social media, but no resistance or backing of Assad was documented. Reports indicate that Iran has moved all members of this group to Iraq. Importantly, throughout the entire period of this group’s operations, no confirmed reports of their involvement in Afghanistan were found, and Afghan security forces did not register any anti-government or security-related activities by the group’s members inside Afghanistan.
2) Zainabiyoun Brigade
The Zainabiyoun Brigade, composed of Pakistani citizens, was formed by Iran’s IRGC to combat ISIS and support Assad’s regime. The recruitment for this group was different from the Fatemiyoun. While Fatemiyoun members were primarily Afghan migrants in Iran, members of the Zainabiyoun Brigade were mostly Pakistanis, particularly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Karachi, and Lahore. The Pakistani government has classified this group as a terrorist organization and has arrested several of its key members in recent years. Social media reports show that individuals wishing to join the Zainabiyoun Brigade must be between the ages of 15 and 35 and are promised a monthly stipend of 120,000 Pakistani Rupees, which in 2015 equated to approximately 1200 US dollars. This group also played a significant role in the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq alongside government and proxy forces, but, similar to the Fatemiyoun, no resistance or support for Assad was reported in recent Syrian conflicts. Due to their designation as a terrorist group, members of Zainabiyoun will likely be unable to return to Pakistan.
3) Hussayniyun Brigade
The Hussayniyun Brigade, made up of citizens from Azerbaijan, was led by Tawhid Ebrahimi (Ibrahim Bili), a Shiite cleric trained in Mashhad, Iran. This group was active alongside other Iranian proxy groups in Syria. Like other groups, it was consistently used to serve the interests of the Iranian government and Assad’s regime. Azerbaijan’s government, due to its ties with Iran, has monitored the activities of this group within its borders, and several of its members have been detained. There have been reports indicating no resistance or support from this group in recent Syrian engagements, and their leader is currently reported to be residing in Iran.
4) Hezbollah Syria
while some analysts claim that this group is composed of Syrian citizens, available information suggests that many of its members are from Lebanon. This group, like other proxy forces, played a significant role in defending Assad’s government during the civil war and in the fight against ISIS. However, in the recent conflict that led to Assad’s downfall, no response from Hezbollah Syria has been reported.
- B) Opponents of Assad
In the opposition front against Assad, a large gathering of radical Sunni Islamists has formed. Alongside groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Jaysh al-Watani, and others, a significant number of citizens from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uyghurs from China, and Pakistan are actively involved. Although these groups did not have independent organizations or separate fronts like the Assad supporters and Iranian proxy groups, extensive information in the media indicates that foreign citizens played a significant role in strengthening Tahrir al-Sham and the fall of Assad’s government.
These groups mainly include:
1) Afghan Citizens
Along with the advance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, many videos and images related to the presence of Afghan citizens alongside Tahrir al-Sham members were published. These citizens, who mostly spoke Pashto, shared congratulatory messages and expressed joy over the progress of their comrades against the Assad government, often referring to the regime as “apostate” and “Rafidhi” (rejecting Shia Islam). These videos and images were widely circulated by Taliban members and supporters on social media.
2) Pakistani Citizens
Pakistani citizens, especially from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, were also highly active in supporting the Assad opposition. Numerous videos and images of these individuals appeared on social media. They referred to the victories of their comrades as “jihad against the Rafidhis” in Pashto and, in one video, said with intense rhetoric: “I will kill every Shia I find.” While the exact number of Pakistani citizens present at Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is unclear, the continuous activity and real-time information shared on social media indicate their notable presence.
3) Khatib al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
This group consists of citizens from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan who have been active in northern Syria for several years, fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, Tahrir al-Sham, and even some members of ISIS fighters. To show their presence and strength, this group frequently reported their advances, wearing organized military uniforms. Due to their subversive activities and ties to terrorist organizations like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group was placed on the UN Security Council’s and the U.S. Department of State’s terrorist lists two years ago.
4) Khatib Imam Bukhari – Imam Bukhari Jamiat
Although most of the activities of Khatib Imam Bukhari members have been reported in Afghanistan, and this group is considered an ally of the Taliban, some reports mention their presence alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The U.S. Department of State describes this group as one of the largest groups of Uzbek citizens in Syria, working closely with Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda. This group has also been designated as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council and the U.S. Department of State.
5) Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement
Although reports, including those from the UN Security Council, suggest the group’s leadership is based in Afghanistan, some analysts confirm its widespread presence in Syria. The group, consisting of Uyghurs, claims to fight for the independence of Xinjiang (East Turkestan), which is also known as a part of China. However, their activities show that this is mainly a slogan, as their operations in Xinjiang or against China’s interests are minimal. Most of their activities have been in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, often alongside other terrorist groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, and more recently, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This group has also been active in Syria, fighting alongside Tahrir al-Sham to overthrow the Assad government. It is also listed as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council and the U.S. Department of State.
6) Jaysh al-Jihad Imam Abu Hanifa
This group consists of citizens from Tajikistan who work alongside radical Islamist groups like Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. Some analysts following their activities suggest that members of this group mostly use social media to recruit people from Tajikistan and became more active during the recent conflict between Tahrir al-Sham and the Assad government. There is little information about the group’s activities in Afghanistan or Tajikistan, but the most well-known jihadist group from Tajikistan remains the Ansarullah movement, which supports the Taliban in Afghanistan.
What will happen to foreign jihadist groups?
With the fall of the Assad government and the rise of Islamist extremist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, expectations from the regional and global community for the new Syrian government are to form a state based on the will of the Syrian people and eliminate any threats to neighboring countries and the world. However, reviewing the histories of groups allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including the group itself, reveals that democratic principles and the formation of a government based on the people’s votes are foreign concepts to them. Currently, power is in the hands of an alliance of extremist Islamist groups, many of which are on the UN’s list of terrorist organizations, including the U.S.
It is clear that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, despite its claims, has not been able to achieve this remarkable success solely through its own human and financial resources, and it will not be able to maintain it without the cooperation of its allied groups, which mostly consist of foreign citizens and radical Islamic groups. This is similar to how the Taliban in Afghanistan is indebted to the cooperation of regional and international terrorist groups like TTP, al-Qaeda, Ansarullah, Jaysh al-Adl, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and others.
Given the dependence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on these groups for success, the group will need them for its survival and will not be able to expel them. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is well aware of the capabilities and ruthlessness of each of these groups’ members and understands that surrendering to any form of democracy, which they view as heretical, will cause it to lose its foundation and would have to take up arms against its current allies. On the other hand, they know that the establishment of a Taliban-style government in Syria will not be acceptable to the Syrian citizens who have lived under a dictatorship disguised as freedom for years, nor to neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel.
Al-Julani, like all radical jihadist leaders, now faces a crucial crossroads. Choosing either path will create new supporters and opponents.
On the other hand, al-Julani knows that his foreign allies have no footing in their own countries except for Afghanistan. Citizens from Central Asia and China, who played an essential role in his victory, cannot even enter their home countries. Afghan and Pakistani citizens are the only ones who, if rejected, can return home or join ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Middle East.
On the other side, there are Iran’s proxy groups, who are nearing the expiration of their mission with the fall of Assad’s government. These groups, who were recruited under the guise of defending religious shrines, no longer control them. Furthermore, the poor treatment of disabled members and their families inside Iran (despite some media coverage of benefits) significantly limits their ability to relocate or be retained within Iran as a reserve force. The collapse of the Shia Crescent in Syria, with the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a serious opponent to Iranian forces in the region and their Shia ideology, eliminates the possibility of transferring these forces by land to Lebanon unless Iran uses air transportation to move them to Lebanon and fill the gap in Hezbollah’s ranks, maintaining them as a threat to Israel.
Another option is to send these forces to Yemen to strengthen the Houthis and use them in future Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb negotiations. However, this option is unlikely, as Iran’s interests are better served by these fighters in Lebanon, given their combat capabilities, rather than in Yemen and the maritime region.
Conclusion
The presence of radical jihadist groups in Syria, whether in opposition to or in support of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the security of Syria and, more broadly, the Middle East. It seems that the victory of these groups will not taste sweet for the Syrian people and their neighbors, including Israel. On the other hand, Turkey could seize this opportunity to allow the return of thousands of Syrians who have fled their country over the years due to the Assad regime’s actions, terrorist groups’ presence, and civil wars. This move could alleviate pressure on Turkish society by providing support to the social foundation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and using it within the structure of Syria’s new government, especially in its security and defense forces. In any case, the continued presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s allies in Syria could present a serious challenge to regional security and provide an opportunity for Hamas as well.
You can read the Persian version of this article here:
سقوط دولت سوریه و آینده جهادگرایان خارجی مخالف و موافق اسد | روزنامه ۸صبح